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THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION  
FOR THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 
 
Nicholas A. Sims†  
 
Introduction 
 
1.  Paragraph 22 of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention1 states that: 
 
22.  The Conference shall not later than one year after the expiry of the fifth and the 
tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention ... convene in special sessions 
to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention.  Such reviews shall take 
into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. [Emphasis 
added] 
 
The first such special session, referred to in this paper as the First Review Conference, is 
scheduled to commence on 28 April 2003. 
 
2.  A central issue that needs to be addressed in any such reviews of the operation of the 
Convention is the extent to which States Parties have implemented their National 
Implementation Measures as such measures are fundamental to the health and effectiveness 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention regime. 
 
3.  Article VII National Implementation Measures of the Convention requires States Parties 
to do various things, of which the most far-reaching is the General Undertaking to 
 
"not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State Party 
under this Convention". (paragraph 1b) [Emphasis added] 
 
In other words, their national implementation must be sufficiently comprehensive to ensure 
that all CWC prohibitions are respected in every place under their control.  To "not permit", 
on this construction, requires States Parties to be active, not passive.  This subparagraph (1b) 
should be regarded as being equivalent in stringency to the prevention criterion which is 
coupled with prohibition in Article IV of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention2, 
which states that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the 
                                                 
† Nicholas A. Sims is a Reader in International Relations in the Department of International Relations at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, Houghton Street, London  WC2A  
2AE, UK. 
1United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Corrected version in accordance with Depositary Notification 
C.N.246.1994.Treaties-5 and the corresponding Proces-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the 
Convention, issued on 8 April 1994.   Available at http://www.opcw.org/cwc/cwc-eng.htm 
2United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, General Assembly resolution 2826 
(XXVI), 16 December 1971.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. [Emphasis 
added] 
 
Even though the word prevent is not used in the CWC language, the requirement in Article 
VII sets a very high standard of national implementation: necessarily so, in view of the 
gravity of the threat to humankind which the CWC, like the BTWC, has been designed to 
counter. 
 
4.  Part of the national implementation required of each State Party consists of designating or 
establishing a National Authority and putting into effect other provisions governing relations 
between the State Party and the OPCW  (paragraphs 4-7 of Article VII).  Another part 
consists of assigning the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the 
environment (paragraph 3). 
 
5.   This Review Conference Paper is confined to addressing the specifically legislative 
requirements of Article VII.  These are to: 
 
"prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place 
under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any  
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal 
legislation with respect to such activity" (paragraph 1a); 
 
"extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural 
persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law" (paragraph 
1c); 
 
"coooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal 
assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1"  
(paragraph 2) 
 
and to 
 
"inform the Organization of the legislative and administrative measures taken to 
implement this Convention" (paragraph 5). 
 
6.  The Legal Adviser's Office of the OPCW Technical Secretariat has compiled reports3 on 
the fulfilment by States Parties of their legislative obligations under Article VII.   For 
example, paragraph 3.6 of the OPCW Annual Report for 2001 reported that 
 
 "As of 31 December 2001, 59 States Parties (41%) had fulfilled their obligation 
under Article VII, paragraph 5, of the Convention to inform the Organisation of their 
implementing measures.  This reflects a three percent increase over last year's figure 
of 38%.  Thus, for 59% of States Parties, the Organisation does not formally know 
                                                 
3See, for example, Office of the Legal Adviser, OPCW Secretariat, Legislation Questionnaire: Preliminary 
Analysis of Responses to the Survey of National Measures to Regulate Scheduled Chemicals under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, S/249/2001 dated 22 May 2001.  Available at http://www.opcw.org/html/ 
global/s_series/2k2/s249_01.html and Office of the Legal Adviser, OPCW Secretariat, National Implementation 
Measures: Legislation Questionnaire  Further Analysis of Responses to the Survey of National Measures to 
Implement the Chemical Weapons Convention, S/269/2001 dated 16 August 2001.  Available at 
http://www.opcw.org/html/ global/s_series/2k2/s269_01.html 
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what their legislative situation is with respect to the implementation of this important 
requirement of the Convention." 
 
Since then, the number of States Parties making a submission in compliance with Article VII, 
paragraph 5, has increased by February 2003 to 82 (55% of States Parties), an increase of 7% 
over October 2002 and of 14% over December 20014. 
 
7.  This increase is certainly to be welcomed.  However, it still leaves 45% of all States 
Parties -- some 68 States Parties -- in non-compliance with this obligation.  45% is a very 
high percentage five years in to the life of the Convention especially given all the assistance 
and encouragement provided to States Parties by the Technical Secretariat and the Legal 
Adviser's Office.   
 
8.  Further analysis by the Legal Adviser's Office has also revealed that not all CWC 
prohibitions are adequately covered in every case, so the proportion of States Parties which 
have adequate legislation in place is significantly lower.  There is, in other words, a 
question-mark over the quality of legislation as well as its quantity.  Only 42 States Parties 
(28%) have legislation covering all key areas.  For 108 States Parties there is either no 
legislation in place, or gaps in legislation, or an unknown legislative situation. 
 
9.  Examples of insufficiency have emerged from responses to OPCW legislation 
questionnaires.  For example, only 57 of 86 States Parties responding replied that they were 
enforcing the end-user certificate requirement for transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to states 
not party to the Convention, as required by the Verification Annex, Part VIII, paragraph 26.  
Even more unsatisfactorily, in view of the explicit requirement in Article VII for the 
enactment of penal legislation, 11 of the 86 responding States Parties (13%) reported having 
no legislation in place to enforce any of the obligations arising under Article I of the 
Convention.5 
 
10.  Taking stock five years on from entry into force, it has to be declared unequivocally that 
this state of affairs is unacceptable.  It endangers the health and the effectiveness of the 
Convention.  This Review Conference Paper sets out why it is important to put matters right, 
addressing three of the key purposes of national implementing legislation and why 
comprehensiveness of scope, in respect of chemicals and in respect of people, is vital before 
concluding with constructive proposals for this Review Conference. 
 
Purposes of National Legislation 
 
11.  National legislation under Article VII serves several purposes of which three are of key 
importance. 
 
12. First, it empowers the National Authority and the OPCW.  It imposes obligations on 
people to cooperate with the National Authority and supply information to it for onward 
transmittal to the OPCW.  It limits chemical transfers to those not prohibited by the 
Convention.  It ensures, in advance, that all OPCW inspectors will be enabled to carry out 
                                                 
4Fiona Tregonning, Developments in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Progress in 
The Hague, Quarterly Review no 41, CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 59, March 2003 
5Fiona Tregonning, Developments in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Progress in 
The Hague, Quarterly Review no 41, CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 59, March 2003 
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their various verification tasks under the Convention without delay or hindrance, and sets out 
their necessary privileges and immunities, in readiness for when they arrive. 
 
13.  Second, it provides for the detection, prosecution and punishment of offenders falling 
within the jurisdiction of each State Party and of offenders possessing its nationality.  Here 
Article VII legislation not only extends the prohibitions in the CWC from the international 
level to the national level:  it gives them explicit legal standing and provides the national 
framework for their enforcement.  Prohibition without enforcement is not enough: it would 
fall short of the criterion of prevention which, as already noted, is implied by the General 
Undertaking in paragraph 1b. 
 
14.  In recent years, anxieties over toxic chemicals falling into terrorist hands have augmented 
the original motivation for the CWC, which had to do rather with the dangers emanating from 
chemical weapons in the possession of governments.  It is important to recognize that 
national implementing legislation is directly relevant to the prosecution of suspected chemical 
terrorists.  In the United Kingdom, for example, criminal charges have been brought under the 
Chemical Weapons Act 1996 –- which is the UK implementing legislation -- following the 
discovery of traces of ricin in premises in north London.  So the legislation required under 
Article VII provides the framework and the means for defending society against chemical 
terrorism, in addition to its original function of ensuring that governments fulfil the national 
implementation of chemical disarmament.  Both aspects are integral to the enforcement of the 
General Undertaking, incumbent on every State Party, to 
 
"not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State Party 
under this Convention." 
 
15.  The third purpose is more nebulous than the first two.  It depends upon a particular view 
of the value of treaties and of how expectations of compliance with treaty obligations are 
embedded in normative structures at national level.  On this view, national legislation ties the 
CWC into national legal systems and contributes to the strengthening of compliance by 
expanding the constituency which has an institutional interest in the success of the 
Convention.  It also builds the treaty regime flowing from the CWC into normative structures 
at the national level, in the form of rules and expectations and procedures for upholding them.   
These rules, expectations and procedures in their turn uphold their counterparts at the 
international level.  They strengthen the international treaty regime.  They help, even if only 
at the margins, to ensure its survival by constituting one more obstacle which would have to 
be overcome if the Convention were to come under attack. 
 
16.  There is a relationship of mutual reinforcement between the international treaty regime of 
the CWC and the national legal regime established by each State Party in accordance with 
Article VII.  At their best, each reinforces the other. 
 
17.  Prescription and practice, too, should actively reinforce each other.  Their relationship 
should be one of complementarity.  If this sounds very abstract and idealistic, the grand 
sweep of the Convention needs to be recalled.  It aims at nothing less than the worldwide 
abolition of chemical weapons, comprehensive, verified and sustained in perpetuity.  That is 
the magnitude of the challenge to every State Party. 
 
 
Comprehensiveness of Scope of Legislation 
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18.  Prohibitions in national implementing legislation need to be formulated with great care, 
to be co-extensive with the prohibitions in the CWC.  If that is not done, the obligations of 
Article VII are not wholly fulfilled.  This in turn weakens the overall regime.  States Parties 
may even, in effect, lay themselves open to charges of non-compliance, thereby inviting 
challenge. 
 
Comprehensiveness of Legislation: Chemicals 
 
19.  The central provision of the Chemical Weapons Convention is the total prohibition in 
Article I that "never under any circumstances" shall a State Party "develop, produce, 
otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, 
chemical weapons to anyone;" with chemical weapons being defined in Article II as 
including “Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with 
such purposes.”  The phrase in bold embodies the comprehensive scope of the Convention 
and is generally referred to as the General Purpose Criterion (GPC) which ensures that past, 
present and future chemical weapons are all prohibited.  The implementation of the General 
Purpose Criterion is placed by Article VI on each State Party which “shall adopt the 
necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, 
produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any 
other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention.”  It needs to be emphasised that the General Purpose Criterion (GPC) must be 
applied to national legislation if the latter is to succeed in being co-extensive with the CWC 
prohibitions.  Otherwise it is unlikely to be fully comprehensive in terms of the scope of its 
coverage of chemicals. 
 
20.  States Parties have to work out how they give effect to this in practice6, in accordance 
with their respective constitutional processes; but it does mean that they must be alert to the 
risk of criminal activity involving toxic chemicals which are not on any Schedule.  It was 
never the case that the CWC would be confined to Scheduled chemicals.  The Schedules were 
included for other reasons, notably the differentiated intensity of verification (of chemical 
weapons non-production) and the related information requirements.  Because of the GPC, 
States Parties need to ensure that their national legislation enables them to detect, prosecute 
and punish any one of the prohibited activities with regard to any toxic chemical, as defined 
in Article II of the Convention, or precursor therof unless the purpose of the activity is not 
prohibited under the Convention, and the types and quantities of the chemicals involved are 
consistent with that purpose. 
 
Comprehensiveness of Legislation: People 
 
21.  There is another aspect to comprehensiveness of legislation, and that is its scope with 
regard not to chemicals but to people. It is important not just to have penal legislation in place 
but to ensure that it covers every person it should cover.  National experience in the United 
Kingdom provides an example. There was an issue of scope in this sense when the UK 
Government started a public consultation over its proposed legislation in 1995.  Vigorous 
debate ensued and one outcome was the addition of a clause to the Bill which is now Section 
                                                 
6Graham S. Pearson, Implementation of the General Purpose Criterion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, First CWC Review Conference Paper No. 3, January  
2003.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/scwc 
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37 of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996.7  Proponents of Section 37 were concerned to make it 
explicit, beyond argument, that government service could never be invoked as an excuse for 
contravening the Act.  They insisted that government officials, including defence scientists 
and members of the armed forces, as well as the politicians to whom they are answerable, 
should be bound by exactly the same obligations as the rest of the population.  Section 37 
gives effect to this aspiration.  The vital words are in paragraph 3: "the provisions made by or 
under this Act apply to persons in the public service of the Crown as they apply to other 
persons." 
 
22.  This is a principle of comprehensiveness which ought to apply globally, whatever the 
particular way in which the laws of different States Parties express it according to their 
constitutional processes and legal traditions.  It is useful to recall that the relevant Australian 
legislation in 1994 and Canadian legislation in 1995 encouraged those of us in the United 
Kingdom who argued in favour of what is now Section 37 to insist that it could indeed be 
done.   In Australia, Section 6 (1) of the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 19948 provides 
that "This Act binds the Crown in all its capacities" and in Canada, Section 5 of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Implementation Act 19959 reads: "This Act is binding on Her Majesty 
in right of Canada or a province." Yet constitutionally those three countries exhibit 
differences as well as similarities. In the end, a UK precedent (paragraph 4 of Section 42 of 
the Radioactive Substances Act 199310) was used as the model for drafting the clause, but the 
experience of other States Parties sharing a common-law tradition was a distinct 
encouragement.   
 
23.  Whatever the constitutional position and whatever the legal tradition of a particular State 
Party, the important thing is that the scope of national legislation must be comprehensive in 
respect of people.  Quality matters, as well as quantity of legislation.  Laws which fall short of 
comprehensiveness fall short in quality. 
 
The Way Ahead 
 
24.  Characteristically, the Final Declarations of Review Conferences for multilateral treaties 
contain exhortations, as States Parties encourage one another to implement the treaty in every 
aspect.  It is urged that, in this hortatory mode, the Final Declaration of this, the first, 
Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference will emphasise the importance of 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of Article VII and state the Conference's understanding of what all 
States Parties need to do in order to implement them fully. 
 
25. Specifically, it is recommended that the Final Declaration should include seven 
exhortations in this area: 
 
a.  First, that States Parties encourage one another to legislate without delay, if they 
have not already done so. 
 
                                                 
7Her Majesty's Stationery Office, The Chemical Weapons Act 1996, 1996 Chapter 6. Available at http://www. 
hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/1996006.html 
8Attorney-General's Department, Government of Australia, Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994.  
Available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/cgi-bin/download.pl?/scale/data/pasteact/2/1147 
9Department of Justice Canada, Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act 1995, 1995 c. 25.  
Available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-27.6/32353.html 
10Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Radioactive Substances Act 1993, 1993 c.12. Available at http://www.hmso. 
gov.uk/acts/acts1993/Ukpga_19930012_en_1.htm 
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b.  Second, that every State Party should check its legislation for adequacy in the light 
of the qualitative analysis by the Legal Adviser's Office of the OPCW Technical 
Secretariat   This analysis demonstrated a worrying gap between the percentage of 
States Parties which have legislated and the percentage of States Parties whose 
legislation is adequate to cover all the requirements of the Convention. 
 
c.  Third, that States Parties should ensure that the scope of their legislation is 
sufficiently comprehensive, in respect of coverage of chemicals on an all-embracing 
basis to match up to the demands of the General Purpose Criterion of the Convention. 
 
d.  Fourth, that States Parties should ensure that the scope of their legislation is 
sufficiently comprehensive, in respect of coverage of people, to encompass 
government officials and scientists, armed forces personnel and the politicians who 
instruct them, in order to leave no doubt that they are all subject to its obligations and 
its penalties equally with the rest of the population. 
 
e.  Fifth, that States Parties should cooperate actively with one another to block any 
gaps between their respective jurisdictions which might, if left uncorrected, be 
exploited by those who take an unhealthy interest in chemical weapons out of terrorist 
or other motives: a danger of which we are even more acutely aware now than when 
the requirement to offer legal assistance was drafted in Article VII paragraph 2. 
 
f.  Sixth, that States Parties should keep the OPCW fully informed of the legislative 
and administrative measures they have taken to implement the CWC and of how these 
have been strengthened as necessary over time. 
 
g.  Seventh, that the Technical Secretariat should continue to provide analytical status 
reports to the States Parties on the qualitative as well as the quantitative fulfilment of 
Article VII for the consideration of the Conference in its regular sessions, and that the 
Conference should accord these reports thorough scrutiny with a view to achieving 
universal, effective implementation of the Convention within all States Parties. 
 
26.  As the extent to which States Parties have implemented their National Implementation 
Measures is fundamental to the health and effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention regime, it is vital that the Review Conference in taking stock five years on from 
entry into force, unequivocally declares that the present state of affairs with regard to 
legislation is unacceptable.  Adequacy of legislation, and in particular comprehensiveness of 
scope, in respect of chemicals and in respect of people, are essential to prevent States Parties 
from, in effect, laying themselves open to charges of non-compliance, thereby inviting 
challenge. 
 
 
